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In this paper the concept of total gross seigniorage is used to analyze sources of
revenues of National Bank of Georgia (NBG) and their distribution in the period
19961999. A comprehensive framework for measuring total seigniorage and its main
components is presented and estimates of seigniorage revenues (sources and uses) are
computed and analyzed. It is shown that in the considered period fiscal revenues from
NBG have not been extensively financed by the money supply (consequently, cannot be
estimated by the monetary seigniorage), but have been mostly covered by the reduction
of the non government debt hold by central bank. Since the stock of international and
private domestic assets hold by National Bank of Georgia is limited, in long run NBG
cannot rely on it. The only way how, in the future, NBG can finance large deficits of the
state budget is to use monetary seigniorage. This, however, will have to be accompanied
by significant growth of monetary base and will cause a danger of large inflation.
5
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In the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, internal armed conflict and
the war in Abkhazia, during the first years of independence Georgia experienced
significant economic crisis. In 19921993 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reduced almost
by 70%. The economy shifted to the shadow sector. The government unable to collect
taxes had to get external debt resulting in significant foreign outstanding arrears. In the
same time huge monetary emissions caused hyperinflation (percentage change in end-
year consumer prices amounted about 7488% in 1993 and 6474% in 1994).
In 1994 government initiated the process of intensive system transformation based
on, in general terms, a transition to a market economy and involved economic
liberalization accompanied by the privatization of the state-owned sector. In 1995
national currency  lari (GEL) was introduced and a number of reforms were
implemented to stabilize and liberalize the Georgian economy. Subsequent
macroeconomic reforms aimed at strengthening the budget, enforcing national currency
stability, reducing inflation rate and ensuring economic growth.
In the following years significant progress has been achieved in establishing
macroeconomic stability. Inflation has sharply fallen and reached the level of 10.9% in
1999. After a massive output decline, real GDP started to increase, showed solid growth
in 1996 and 1997 (11,2% and 10,8%, respectively) and stabilized at the level of about
3% in 1998 and 1999. Deficit of the state budget decreased from 6,8% of GDP in 1996
to 3,7% of GDP in 1999 (3,9% of GDP in 1998).
Reforms of tax legislation, and as a result, improvement of the tax base played
a substantial role in realization of tax and fiscal program. However, notwithstanding the
rate of improvement in budgetary revenue collection, there are still serious difficulties.
The main reasons for budget revenues shortfall are: The shadow economy, tax evasion,
low level of registration, as well as the poor financial conditions of enterprises and
organizations. Deficit financing in Georgia is carried out mainly through loans from the
National Bank of Georgia (by direct borrowing) and loans from abroad (mainly from
international organizations). We have to note that the credits from NBG are critical for
financing the deficit of the state budget. In particular, in 1996 about 73% of the budget
deficit (5,2% of GDP) has been financed by NBG. In subsequent years budgetary
revenues from NBG decreased but still remain significant (about 3,0%, 1,4% and 2,7%
of GDP , respectively) [1]. On the other hand in the period considered the monetary
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[1] See Section 4.policy of the National Bank of Georgia, aimed to achieve economic growth with minimal
inflation, was rather strict. The analysis aims to explain from which sources NBG is able
to finance so big part of the budget deficit and what could be the long run consequences
of such practices for the economy.
Theoretical focus of the paper is on adequacy of different concepts of the measuring
the contribution of seigniorage to the financing budget deficit. For example, applying the
common concept of monetary seigniorage, which is defined as the change in a country's
base money stock deflated by the general price level, the Georgian government should
have received 51,6 million GEL in 1996, while in fact it received almost four times more,
i.e., 195,8 million GEL. Similar differences can be found in all other years of the analyzed
period. Therefore, in theoretical context the analysis intends to show that if the portfolios
of actual central banks are diversified between government debt and non government
debt, the monetary seigniorage provides no information about the flow of seigniorage to
the budget.
2. Seigniorage Revenues
A number of authors consider seigniorage revenues as an important source of
government finance [see, e.g., Drazen, 1989; and Gross, 1993]. Recent research shows
that the seigniorage in several Western European countries as a share of GDP varies
between 2 and 4% [Horrendorf, 1997]. The importance of seigniorage as a revenue
instrument in transition economies has been also frequently analyzed [see, for example,
Hochreiter, Rovelli and Winckler, 1996; Budina, 1997; Cukrowski and Janecki, 1998;
Cukrowski and Stavrev, 1999, 2000]. The results indicate that the experiences in
collecting seigniorage revenue differ across countries and revenues from the creation of
monetary base and execution of monetary policy play very different budgetary roles in
countries in the process of transition to market economy.
As mentioned in the introduction in subsequent years significant part of the budget
deficit has been financed by National Bank of Georgia, however, without corresponding
growth in the monetary base. This phenomenon cannot be easily explained by the
concept of monetary seigniorage (frequently used in the economic literature), and
requires deeper analysis of the sources of central bank revenues.
In the analysis which follows we adopt the concept of gross seigniorage, proposed by
Klein and Neumann, (1990) and Neumann (1996), which encompasses most of other
commonly used concepts of seigniorage [see Neumann, 1996]. In particular, we define
7
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with base money creation [Neumann, 1996]. Formally, we specify total gross seigniorage
s as
(1)
where sM is monetary seigniorage defined as a change in base money stock DM deflated
by the general price level p:
(2)
(m denotes real balances);
sI describes net interest revenues on the stock of non-government debt
(3)
AP and AF denote a private sector debt and foreign debt, respectively (iP and iF stand for
corresponding nominal interest rates);
sOP describes net revenues from the central bank operations 
(4)
G denotes revenue from central bank's operations;
sNI denotes net reduction of the non-government debt by the central bank
(5)
DAP and  DAF denote changes in domestic private sector debt and foreign debt,
respectively;
Monetary seigniorage (2) measures the actual wealth transfer which the private
sector has to make in order to receive base money in the amount of DM from the central
bank. Expression (3) describes the flow of interest revenue on the stock of non-
government debt that the central bank bought in the past in exchange for non-interest
bearing base money (the debt service on the central bank's stock of government debt is
not included here because it is merely an inside transaction between the government and
the central bank). Expression (4) describes seigniorage from realized gains from assets
trading (central bank's financial operations). Expression (5) describes central bank
revenues from the reduction of the non governmental debt hold by the central bank. It
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- =have to mentioned that in developed countries net investment in domestic private and
foreign debt is typically a positive value, and, consequently, it is considered as an use of
the seigniorage [see e.g., Neumann, 1996]. However, in the case of NBG (see Section 4)
the non government debt is being reduced from year to year, and to large extent
corresponding revenues are used to finance budget deficit. Consequently, in the present
analysis the central bank revenues from the reduction of the non governmental debt are
considered as the source of the seigniorage rather than an use.
3. Distribution of Seigniorage Revenues
Most empirical literature presents a proxy for actual seigniorage flow to the
government based on two implicit assumptions: (1) the government receives the
seigniorage revenues regardless of the legal and institutional regulations governing the
relationship between the government and central bank; (2) the amount of seigniorage
revenue transferred to the government does not depend on the specific ways and means
in which the creation of seigniorage is induced by the central bank. This is a simplification
which does not take into account the cost of money production and the existence of the
central bank in general. Note that the cost of the central bank could be significant [Klein
and Neumann, 1990] show that in the period 19741987, about 16.9% of German
monetary seigniorage was used to cover the Bundesbanks operating costs).
A more precise analysis presented by Neumann (1996) shows that total seigniorage
is used for 
 covering the cost of money production and central bank operation sC,
 replacement investment to make up for the exchange rate induced loss of assets (in
terms of domestic currency) sRI, 
 budget finance sG, 
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=CCoin denotes the cost of coinage, and CCB stands for the central bank's cost of printing
notes and maintaining operations;
(8)
L denotes a book loss (defined as a positive number), and e is an exchange rate;
(9)
AG denotes government debt and RG appropriated profit;
(10)
RO denotes profit transferred to the third parties or used for reserves and capital
accumulation.
Part of the seigniorage transferred to the central government budget sG (specified by
expression (9)) is called fiscal seigniorage [see Neumann, 1996]. In general, there should
be two additional terms in the numerator of the expression (9): RCoin  revenue from
coinage (in the case where the government has rights to issue coins as in Germany, for
example); and TB  taxes on central bank's property and income (when the central bank
has to pay taxes on property and income as, for instance, in Japan). In the case of Georgia
the government receives fiscal seigniorage through: (1) net borrowing from the central
ba (DAG), and (2) appropriation of the central bank's profit, net of interest payments on
the central bank's stock of government debt (RG-iGAG). Thus, fiscal seigniorage is fully
determined by expression (9).
4. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis of sources and uses of seigniorage revenues presented in this
section is based on data from the central bank balance sheets and its statements of
income and expenditures and profit distribution (the main data sources are the Annual
Reports of National Bank of Georgia for the years 1996,1997,1998,1999) . Since data for
1995 (and before 1995) are unaudited (and rather not consistent) the sample period
selected covers years 19961999. All the data are reported annually and denoted in the
analysis which follows by subscript t.
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O =According to the Section 3 the total seigniorage st is allocated to the following uses:
(11)
where the cost seigniorage st
C is computed as
(12)
CCB  costs of maintaining operations of central bank,
CCo&Bn  costs of coinage and printing banknotes,
replacement seigniorage st
RI is determined as 
(13)
fiscal seigniorage st
G is computed as
(14)
and the increase of the central bank capital and reserves st
G is determined as
(15)
where Pt denotes the total profit of the central bank in the period considered.
On the other hand, the total seigniorage st is the sum of the following sources:
(16)
where the monetary seigniorage st
M is computed as 
(17)
seigniorage revenue from the stock of interest-earning foreign and domestic private
assets st
I is determined as
(18)
where  IRt and  IEt correspond to interest revenues and interest expenditures,
respectively;
11


















































































=and seigniorage revenue from central bank's operations st
OP is computed as
(19)
where REt denotes the total revenue of the central bank from assets trading.
Finally, the investment seigniorage st
NI is computed as a residual, i.e., 
(20)
In Table 1, the sources and uses of seigniorage for the overall sample period
19961999 are presented in GEL (all flows are expressed in 1996 prices).
The year by year developments of the sources of total gross seigniorage as a fraction
of GDP are presented in Figure 1. The distribution of the total gross seigniorage in
subsequent years as a fraction of GDP is presented in Figure 2.
As shown in Figure 2, in the whole period considered revenues from NBG were
significantly used for government purposes. Fiscal seigniorage in the considered period
amounted about 5,2% of GDP in 1996, 3% in 1997, 1,4% in 1998 and 2,7% of GDP in
1999. Reduction of the non government debt hold by NBG was the main source of the
budgetary revenue from the central bank (Figure 3) [2]. In 1996 about 70% of the
budgetary revenues from central bank was financed by the decrease in non government
debt hold by NBG. In 1998 NBG used resources from the reduction of the domestic
private sector and foreign debt not only to increase credit to the government but also to
cover other losses (in 1998 the decrease in non government debt hold by NBG amounted
exceeded the budgetary revenues from central bank by 15%).
It is worth mentioning that changes in fiscal seigniorage in Georgia are not closely
correlated with changes in the monetary base, and, consequently with the monetary
seigniorage (Figure 4). Since total seigniorage is used to cover all central bank expenses
it usually overestimates flow of the resources from the central bank to the budget (Figure
5). Finally, we would like to stress that there is no direct correlation between yearly
inflation rates and neither corresponding values of fiscal seigniorage nor monetary
seigniorage (see Figure 6) [3]. 
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[2] It has to be  mentioned that the reduction in the non government debt has been estimated as a residual,
and consequently, it accommodates all possible errors in the data used. Nevertheless, we believe that the
numbers presented are significant enough to represent an actual trend. 
[3] Since there are only a few observations in the analysed period (to few for proper econometric analysis),
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Table 1. Sources and Uses of Seigniorage in Georgia (in 1996 prices)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Million of GEL
Total St 216.6 135.4 178 172.3
Sources
Monetary St
M 51.6 71.3 6.7 55.7
Interest Revenues St








NI 138.3 21.0 49.2 63.1
Uses
Costs St








O 1.0 3.4 -68.5 33.4
Fiscal St




M 23.8% 52.7% 3.8% 32.3%
Interest Revenues St








NI 63.9% 15.5% 27.6% 36.6%
Uses
Costs St
C 9.1% 4.5% 9.4% 11.2%
Replacement for
exchange rate loss St
RI




O 0.5% 2.51% -38.5% 19.4%
Fiscal St
G 90.4% 92.9% 34.9% 68.9%14
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Figure 3. Revenues from the Reduction of the Non Government Debt Hold by NBG and
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5. Macroeconomic Comment
According to official documents of the National Bank of Georgia the main target of
NBG in the considered period was to ameliorate macroeconomic imbalances, and to
achieve economic growth with minimal inflation and an optimal level of the exchange
rate. As a result the monetary policy of NBG was very strict. In accordance with these
targets money supply grew with a simultaneous reduction in net international assets,
growth in net domestic assets (in 1998 and 1999), and extensive lending to the
government.  
As a result of very tight monetary policy, in last few years the National Bank of
Georgia has mainly been supplying money through direct credits to the government and
very rarely played a role of a lender of last resort. In 1998, out of the total credits of 294,1
million GEL 97,6% represented credits to the government and only 2,4% went to
commercial banks. In 1999 the total credits to commercial banks were even lower (i.e.,
in 1999 of 147,2 million GEL total credit, 146,7 million GEL (99,7%) was issued to the
government, and only 0,5 million GEL (0,3%) to commercial banks). On the other hand
the minimum reserve requirement increased in 1998 from 12% to 16%. In 1999 the
stock of net claims on the government and its growth exceeded corresponding targets
defined by IMF by 101,4 million GEL and 101,3 million GEL respectively.
As mentioned above, although the main policy instrument used by the NBG was
direct lending to the government this practice did not have much influence on the yearly
inflation. This is because, only part of the transfers from the National Bank of Georgia to
the government resulted from relatively restricted money supply. Taking into account
that the NBGs flow balance sheet can be written as 
(21)
where the left hand sums the changes in net foreign assets, in loans to the private sector,
loans to the government (net of government deposits) and fixed assets of NBG; the right
hand side sums changes in the monetary base and the NBG total capital accounts;
and presented as in Table 2, it becomes clear that the other part of an extensive
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The shares of these two sources in the financing of the budget deficit in the
subsequent years of the period considered are presented in Table 3 (the monetary
seigniorage and the revenues from the reduction of net assets are definitely the main
sources of the financing of the budget deficit, moreover, in some years, e.g., 1998 and
1999, revenues from these sources have been used for the financing of other expenses
of NBG).
Table 2. Flow Balance Sheet of National Bank of Georgia for the Period 19961999
(in million GEL)
1996 1997 1998 1999
Change in net foreign assets -141,10 -12,82 -233,47 -45,69
+
Change in loans to the private sector -0,99 -27,39 39,73 40,97
+
Change in loans to the government (net of
government deposits)
194,87 131,22 172,14 65,70
+
Change in fixed assets of NBG 3,77 0,99 4,73 9,41
=
Change in monetary base 51,61 76,96 7,47 70,39
+
Change in capital and reserves 4,93 15,05 -24,34 0,00
Table 3. The Shares of the Monetary Seigniorage and Revenues from the Reduction of
Net Assets in the Financing of the Budget Deficit
1996 1997 1998 1999
Deficit of the state budget (% of GDP) 6,8% 6,1% 3,9% 3,7%
Fiscal seigniorage (in % of GDP) 5,2% 3,0% 1,4% 2,7%
Share of NBG in financing budget deficit 76% 49% 36% 72%
Monetary seigniorage as a percentage of
fiscal seigniorage
26% 57% 11% 46%
Share of the revenues from the reduction of
net assets as a percentage of fiscal
seigniorage
70% 16% 104% 100%We have to stress that, the extended financing of the deficit of the state budget by
the NBG is still costly. It does not result in higher inflation (because of restricted money
supply), but it mainly reduces net assets of the National Bank of Georgia. Since the stock
of international and private domestic assets hold by NBG is limited, in long run the only
way how NBG can finance the deficit of the state budget to the similar extend is to use
monetary seigniorage. This, however, will have to be accompanied by significant growth
of monetary base and will cause a danger of large inflation.
The key reform challenge is therefore to reduce the size of the deficit of the state
budget (see Table 3) caused by extremely low tax revenues (with about 7,4% of GDP in
1999 and 6,9% of GDP in 1998 tax revenues in Georgia are among the lowest in all
transition economies). Thus, improving tax compliance will be the key to overcoming
budgetary crisis and ensure successful continuation of macroeconomic stabilization. The
major challenge will be to improve tax system to balance the decline in profit and
turnover taxes from the contracting state sector with increased revenues from other
sources, such as VAT and personal income tax. 
Delay in the implementation of the tax reform, accompanied with the extended
financing of the budget deficit by the National Bank of Georgia, sooner or later will result
in significant increase of monetary base and destabilization of the economy.
6. Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented and applied new insights from the seigniorage literature to
the problem of financing the budget deficit in Georgia through seigniorage revenues
during the process of market reforms, i.e., in the period 19961999. In particular,
contrary to other empirical studies we have not relied on the simple concept of monetary
seigniorage, which measures the flow of the additional monetary base the government
can issue, but instead we have used (1) the new concept of total gross seigniorage which
measures the total flow to the government sector and (2) fiscal seigniorage which
measures the portion of seigniorage received for budget finance. 
An empirical analysis of sources of seigniorage revenues in Georgia for the period
19961999 has revealed that the monetary authorities' interest earnings on non-
government debt (interest revenues) and revenues from central bank operations are
important sources of total seigniorage revenues, and therefore, the conventional concept
of monetary seigniorage inadequately measures the total flow of seigniorage. In particular,
the results show that an estimation of the total seigniorage by monetary seigniorage
19
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that most of the budgetary revenues from NBG in the considered period have been
financed by the reduction of the private sector debt, monetary seigniorage should not be
used a proxy for the total flow to the government sector.
Moreover, the research presented shows that the average flow of seigniorage
revenues to the budget was higher than it is usually the case in other countries in
transition. Thus it confirms the common belief that in several transitional economies
revenues from central bank seigniorage still play a significant budgetary role. We have to
stress, however, that in Georgia in the period considered the flow of the resources from
the central bank to the budget was not connected with inflationary monetary emissions.
Instead most budgetary revenues from NBG have been financed by significant reduction
of net international and private domestic assets. Since such practices are surely not
sustainable, the problem of financing budget deficit has to be realized by central bank and
fiscal authorities. Since the stock international and private domestic assets hold by
National Bank of Georgia is limited, in long run NBG can finance the deficit of the state
budget only using monetary seigniorage. This, however, will be accompanied by
significant growth of monetary base and large inflation.
Finally, it is important to stress that the results presented in this paper imply
a weakening of the link between inflation and seigniorage. In particular, much like Klein
and Neumann (1990), we would like to emphasize that the increase in a yearly change of
monetary base (and a country's inflation rate) does not automatically imply higher fiscal
seigniorage revenues. Nor (as it has been shown in the case of Georgia) does the inverse
necessarily hold, i.e., a decrease in a yearly change of monetary base (associated with the
decrease in the rate of inflation) does not automatically imply smaller seigniorage
revenues for budget deficit financing. The increase in the scope of temporary budget
deficit financing can be achieved by the relevant central bank policy and increasing central
bank efficiency instead of by raising the rate of inflation [4]. However, an analysis of the
efficiency of legal arrangements and operational procedures of the National Bank of
Georgia has been left for further research.
20
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[4] Klein and Neumann (1990) show that a central bank with a sufficient extent of operational
independence might be able to influence the amount of seigniorage acquiring to the government even at
unchanged rates of money growth.21
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Appendix.  Data Sources
The main sources of data used for the calculations of the total gross seigniorage and
its components are: (1) National Bank of Georgia Balance Sheet and (2) the National Bank
of Georgia Statement of Revenue and Expenditure. The simplified forms of these two
documents (for 19961999) are presented in Table A1 and Table A2 below. A short
description follows of how Table A3 (containing all the data used for the computation of



















































Table A1. National Bank of Georgia Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999 (GEL)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ASSETS
Gold and foreign currency assets
          Gold 883209 875959 699292 956925 1038400
          IMF related assets 204543817 203344161 196512495 149934576 411233875
          Other foreign assets 243773088 249263150 308791301 292575809 327469977
Domestic currency assets
          Loans to the Government 112445213 296718389 437139344 541523103 646004776
          Loans and deposits with banks 2329910 13337196 3240939 5139277 479316
Government Debt Securities 70337352 28080133
          Other assets 43248352 30683838 45069089 56050853 98039745
Fixed assets 3678774 7448186 8436258 13161869 22576651

















































































Table A1. National Bank of Georgia Balance Sheet as of December 31, 1995,1996,1997,1998,1999 (GEL)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
LIABILITIES
Foreign currency liabilities
          Banks 4747144 2361746 551572 8311198 5270476
          Loans and liabilities to IMF 346107191 449664432 530367308 688859655 1014616990
          Other 44986117 89194451 75639902 80318501 99566347
Domestic currency liabilities
          Notes and coins in circulation 173965907 215593128 298266914 273346099 350659346
          Deposits
              Deposits of the Government 13668255 3075603 12271780 14853121 11376937
              Deposits of Banks 18101200 23385650 22511377 37748541 48700134
              Deposits of other 2481649 7184628 2340555 19494613 1623313
          Other liabilities 1187919 625427 32302472 5448036 1809330
Total liabilities 605245382 791085065 974251880 1128379764 1533622873
Capital and Reserves 5656981 10585814 25636838 1300000 1300000
Total



















































Table A2. National Bank of Georgia Statement of Revenue and Expenditures as of December 31, 1995,1996,1997,1998,
1999 (GEL)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
REVENUES
        Foreign currency related revenues 6022954 11755776 11980987 11146077 10219735
        Domestic revenue interest 3947563 19288706 43812550 59624297 80681072
        Domestic revenues other 581862 1797588 713802 582475 744955
Total Revenues 10552379 32842070 56507339 71352849 91645762
EXPENSES
        Interest and other 5886227 7614648 8358407 11502697 15153468
        Bad and doubtful loan expenses 407478 13934080 8271136 9273459
        Cost of notes and coin production 1391951 41359
        Other expenses 2333905 4408851 6608187 10422566 16103569
Total operating expenses 8627610 27349530 14966594 30196399 40571855
Operating profit (in terms of NBG) 1924769 5492540 41540745 41156450 51073907
        Loses caused by foreign exchange
        rate variability -110601399 -8816688
Operating profit (in terms of IAS) 1924769 5492540 41540745 -69444949 42257219
APPROPRIATIONS AND TRANSFERS TO/FROM
RESERVES
Transfer to the general reserve -570900 -152676 -3654123 5000000
Transfer to the government -962777 -4500000 -37886622 -7000000
Retained loss/(profit) 71444949 -42257219
Transfer to capital -391092 -839864
Total appropriations and transfers (to)/from

















































































Table A3. Data Used for the Computation of the Total Gross Seigniorage and its Main Components
Year P C
CB C
Co&BN G R R
G-i
GA
G IR-IE L A
G DM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1996 100,0 18342931 1391951 13553364 992540 4500000 11674058 1433092 293642786 51614650
1997 107,9 6608187 0 12694789 3654123 37886622 35454143 -1732082 424867564 76955440
1998 111,6 18693702 0 11728552 -76444949 7000000 48121600 -110601399 456332630 7470407
1999 126,4 25377028 41359 10964690 42257219 0 65527604 -8816688 606547706 70393540
Notes:
P  general price level index (1996 = base year)
CCB  costs of maintaining operations (in GEL),
CCo&Bn  costs of printing banknotes (in GEL),
G  revenue from central bank's operations (in GEL),
R  profit transfer to increase reserves and capital (in GEL)
(RG-iGAG)  net profit distributed to the government (in GEL),
(IR-IE)  net interest revenues reported (in GEL),
L  book gain (loss) due to exchange rate fluctuation (in GEL),
AG  government debt to NBG (in GEL),
DM  change in the monetary base (in GEL).Sources
CCB (costs of maintaining operations) computed base on the data presented in the
National Bank of Georgia Statement of Revenue and Expenditures (see Table A2, the
items: "Bad and doubtful loan expenses" + "Other expenses").
CCo&BN (cost of printing banknotes and making coins) is presented in the National
Bank of Georgia Statement of Revenue and Expenditures (see Table A2, the item: "Cost
of notes and coin production").
G (revenue from central bank's operations) presented in the National Bank of Georgia
Statement of Revenue and Expenditures (see Table A2, the items: "Foreign currency
related revenues" + "Domestic revenues other").
R (profit transfer to increase reserves and capital) reported in the National Bank of
Georgia Statement of Revenue and Expenditures (see Table A2, the item: "Transfer to the
general reserve" +  "Transfer to the capital").
RG-iGAG (net profit distributed from central bank to the government) reported in the
National Bank of Georgia Statement of Revenue and Expenditures (see Table A2, the
item: "Transfer to the government").
IR-IE (net interest revenues of the National Bank of Georgia) determined as 
a difference between interest revenues (Table A2, the item "Domestic revenue interest")
and interest expenditures (Table A2, the item "Interest and other"). 
L (book gain/loss) due to exchange rate fluctuation reported in the National Bank of
Georgia Statement of Revenue and Expenditures (Table A2, the item "Loses caused by
foreign exchange rate variability")
AG (government debt held by the National Bank of Georgia) is determined as the sum
of loans to general government (Table A1, the item "Loans to the Government") minus
deposit of general government (Table A1, the item "Deposits of the Government") (in the
years 1998 and 1999 minus stock of government debt securities (Table A1, item
"Government Debt Securities") that have been borrowed to NBG in 1998 and partially
returned in 1999).
DM (the change in the monetary base). Monetary base is defined as the sum of
currency in circulation and the deposits of commercial banks and others (non
governmental) and is determined based on the National Bank of Georgia Balance Sheet
(Table A1, the items "Notes and coins in circulation"+"Deposits of Banks"+"Deposits of
other").
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